Why Optimistic Economists are Getting Trump’s Tariffs All Wrong with Abhijit Das
Insights into the current state of Trump's trade war
In this episode, author and journalist Puja Mehra speaks to trade policy expert Abhijit Das. President Donald Trump's Liberation Day, as Trump calls it, is a serious blow to the rules-based global trade order that the US had led as a champion of free trade for 80 years. This trading system was biassed against developing countries like India and in favour of developed countries, but the rise of low-cost manufacturing in China has meant that the US no longer dominates the world economy. At the core of Trump's blow to the trading system is the US' frustration over unequal market access. What are the implications for India? Is the old world trade order lost forever? What should replace it? Tune in for insights into the current state of Trump's trade war.
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TRANSCRIPT
Puja Mehra (host): Hello, I'm Puja Mehra. President Donald Trump's sweeping reciprocal tariffs have gone into effect. China has pressed tariffs on imports from the US in retaliation at a rate exactly matching Trump's.
The EU too may join this trade war soon. Liberation Day, as Trump calls it, is a serious blow to the rules-based global trade order that the US had led as a champion of free trade for 80 years. This trading system was biased against developing countries like India and in favour of developed countries, but the rise of low-cost manufacturing in China has meant that the US no longer dominates the world economy.
At the core of Trump's blow to the trading system is the US' frustration over unequal market access. Might what's happening turn out to be good for India? Is the old world trade order lost forever?
What should replace it? My guest on the show today is Professor Abhijit Das, who, on an earlier episode, helped us understand how the US has systematically sabotaged the rules-based trading system all along since the time the Obama administration was in office. Today, Professor Das explained how Trump is moving to replace it with a power-based system and how narratives suggesting there are silver linings for India oversimplify what's actually going on.
Professor Das is one of India's leading trade experts. He has worked in India's commerce industry. Professor Das is one of India's leading trade experts.
He has worked in India's commerce ministry, was the head of the Centre of WTO Studies at the Indian Institute of Foreign Trade, and has long years of experience of contributing to India's international trade negotiations, including in the anti-dumping and subsidy negotiations at the WTO.
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Puja Mehra: Professor Das, thank you for coming again on the show to help us understand the implications and fallout of the April 2 announcement by US President Donald Trump on his reciprocal tariffs plan.
Abhijit Das: Thank you, Puja, for having me back on your show.
Puja Mehra: I thought we would approach what has happened in two broad questions. One, the question of understanding what is going on, what is this new world trade order that seems to be emerging, if it is going to lead to a complete abdication of what was earlier the WTO and the rules-based order, howsoever dissatisfactory for various trade partners, what might replace it if it is given up completely or if there is going to be some effort to salvage whatever remains of it. And once we understand what is happening around the world, the implications of what has happened on April 2, after that I thought we would come to India and what it means for India, etc.
So, I wanted to first understand what this new trade order is that we are seeing. Is this a temporary arrangement or is it permanent because we are seeing countries are responding to what has been announced by the US with reciprocal tariffs. They are not going to the WTO for remedies, perhaps because of the reasons you would explain last time you were on the show.
So, what is this new trade order and is this the end of the free trade era as we know it?
Abhijit Das: Puja, what we need to recognise is that it's not yet a new order that is emerging. We are in the midst of chaos. We are at the centre of a disorder.
What this disorder will lead to remains to be seen, whether it will result in the WTO getting completely sidelined, made completely irrelevant, or whether the WTO will emerge in a different incarnation with some additional set of rules, with some new disciplines. That remains to be seen. It's also possible that we might be confronted with an entirely different configuration of rules whereby we do not have any overarching set of framework of rules the way WTO provides it.
Instead, it would be a regime that is completely dominated by power play, and that is what we are witnessing today. So, will this power play-dominated regime persist? If it does, for how long?
Is it a permanent feature now? We are literally at the crossroads, and I don't think any of us have a clear answer to the path which countries are going to take. But what is certain is the reality that countries at this juncture are scrambling to protect their market access in the United States.
In other words, they are looking more at their immediate gains or to cut their immediate losses. And not too many countries are looking at the larger picture or the world of rules, say, a few years down the line. And for me, that is really a matter of worry.
As you've said, the World Trade Organisation rules are not perfect. In fact, India has been at the forefront of articulating its reservations, its concerns in many areas, particularly agriculture as well as intellectual property rights. But at least we have a semblance of a rules-based system which did provide some certainty, some predictability to nations, to international businesses to conduct trade.
We are gradually losing out on that very valuable public good. Where that will all end up with, again, is a very difficult question. So certainly we will have to see how different countries try to balance their immediate interest in terms of cutting their losses in the US market with the desirability of having a rules-based system in the near future.
Puja Mehra: So I've read, Professor Das, people saying that what seems to be happening is that we are moving towards more bilateral agreements, free trade agreements. But I was confused. Is it not true that the US has free trade agreements with Japan and South Korea, but they are not exempt from the reciprocal tariffs plan?
Is that right?
Abhijit Das: Yes, you are absolutely correct, Puja. The US does have free trade agreements with a large number of countries and it is not respecting the provisions of those free trade agreements. That reinforces my concern on the power play which we are witnessing and the very rapid erosion in the respect for trade rules, be those rules at the WTO or be those rules of the FTAs being implemented between various countries and the United States.
And linked to this is the previous question which you had raised about whether we are seeing the end of the era of free trade. What we have to recognise is the fact that what is popularly called the era of free trade was beset with a large number of barriers erected particularly by the developed world in sectors where they were not competitive. In particular, in agriculture, the developed world as is fairly well known was not competitive in many, many products and they found legitimate as well as ingenious, illegitimate ways of respecting market access.
So while the world used to be called a world of liberal trade, free trade, it really was free trade or liberal trade when it suited the developed world. Where it did not suit the developed world, the principles of free trade were put on the side and of course that was not commented upon much by most of the media, by much of the academia as well. So we had a mirage that we were living in a world of free trade whereas the reality was slightly different from that.
Puja Mehra: Right, so given we seem to have so much dissatisfaction with the WTO era, like you're saying the rules were gained in favour of the developed world and biased against the developing world. The entire trade system was so heavily dependent on American demand, consumption demand. It was so vulnerable to the Chinese overcapacity which is the main grouse that the developed world has right now even if they exclude the developing world's complaints.
Does the WTO then remain relevant or there is genuinely a need to come up with something to replace it?
Abhijit Das: There is no doubt that the relevance of WTO is getting eroded literally by the day, especially in light of the actions of the United States. Having said that, to come up with an alternate regime which will depart dramatically from the WTO would really be too long a shot. To my mind we will have to work partly with the WTO template, see how we can make improvements in the template, and how we can expand the template to promote the legitimate development aspirations of a large number of WTO members.
I do recognise that for that to happen there has to be greater coherence, greater coordination, greater coalition building, greater trust amongst the developing world themselves. If the trust is missing, if the coordination among the developing countries is missing, then whatever new set of rules that might emerge might perhaps be more skewed against the interests of the developing world. So really it's the developing world which has to be on the guard, which has to make sure that in a scenario where rules of a new trading regime are being negotiated, they try to find convergence, they try to find common grounds on as many issues as possible and articulate their common ground which will really help promote their development concerns.
Let's not forget that much of the rule making which has happened at the WTO and which is happening through free trade agreement negotiations really are about shrinking the policy space of countries for implementing catch-up policies, policies which can help them bridge the development gap with the developed world. Now that paradigm has to change. The paradigm of new rules that might emerge has to be different.
It cannot be the same old objective that through trade rules we tie the hands of countries and that is something which the academia for the past so many decades has been tom-tomming as a big achievement of the GATT and the WTO. That worked for the developed world but that just did not work for the developing countries. We need to recognise this reality, we need to put on our thinking caps to see how we can have a different template of rules, what changes are required in the WTO rules.
So this will really be a long haul but even if it's a long haul that must not discourage us, this is a time for developing countries to come together, to coalesce, to show consolidation, to join hands, work together in finding solutions that promotes the overall economic development of the smaller countries and the developing world as a whole.
Puja Mehra: Professor Das, what you're saying, it seems to me that for that to happen, even if it is going to be a long haul, there are two necessary conditions. One, there's going to be political leadership for the developing world which will take this up and two, there has to be reasonable political leadership because at the base of all of this is a lot of politics, a lot of class disparities etc. in the advanced world where there are such grievances in the working classes, for instance against Chinese imports and the industrialisation because of that.
So what is required is political leadership also in the developed world which I don't see right now. And the second condition, necessary condition would be for, like you're saying, academia to sort of rise to this because even Indian economists, trade economists, well-known economists who are in the US and are always very keen to sort of tell India how to be more free in trade, how to lower our barriers, I find have fallen completely silent. They are not saying anything at all about the Trump status plan.
Abhijit Das: Let me address the two questions in sequence. You're very correct Puja that we need to have a strong political leadership which can help in creating a new template of rules but to backstop or to provide the intellectual inputs for the political will, for the political leadership, will require a lot of thinking by the academia, by the government officials and that's an area where countries like India, Brazil, Argentina, Indonesia, Malaysia, Turkey, they are well positioned to kickstart this process.
If this process is not kickstarted then I'm afraid either we will end up continuing with the uncertain, completely power-based regime that we are witnessing today or we might have another set of rules which are more skewed against the interests of the developing countries.
Puja Mehra: You know there was a story in The Economist magazine which sort of says that they see two sets of blocks rising post April 2. One they call the open market allies, Canada, UK, Japan, Mexico, Switzerland, South Korea etc. And the second they call the strategic hedgers like India, Turkey, Brazil etc.
But isn't it talking to these other countries in the strategic hedgers grouping which is a nomenclature given by The Economist magazine but I thought it ties in with what you're saying. I find India is negotiating with the US primarily right now.
Abhijit Das: In the public domain Puja you're very right. The information that we have is India is very actively and intensively engaging with the US for a bilateral trade agreement. We do not have any information whether India is discussing the present crisis in the global trading system with other developing countries.
I do hope it is engaging in such moves because now is the time to show political leadership. Now is the time for our trade negotiators and other diplomats to rise to the occasion and in a way take forward many of their own visions of what a fair balanced development friendly multilateral trading system should be. So to get back to your question whether India is talking to other countries, I have no information but I do hope India has started talking and if India has not started talking there is an imperative for India to take the lead or if other countries have taken the lead then India must not shy away from such conversations.
India has much to offer, India has the experience, India has confronted many problems and most of the problems which India confronts in its economy have characteristics with problems which many other developing countries face and that's why we say India is the voice of the global south. So the perspectives which India can bring onto the negotiating table can be very valuable but we have to be there for the conversation to go ahead. We cannot be missing from this conversation.
Now coming to your earlier question about the academics particularly the free trade academics having gone completely silent, well I really don't have much to say on that except to remind ourselves that there are segments in the academia both the legal fraternity as well as the fraternity of economists who would find every excuse to decipher or to seek an inkling of virtue in actions of the developed world.
Unfortunately for them this time the actions of President Trump have really upset their apple cart. So I'm waiting with keenness to see how many of these economists and legal experts react to the present unfolding crisis.
Puja Mehra: So yeah India needs to sort of take on the mantle of the guardian I suppose of the developing world, the global south like you're saying. But one point of view I hear some and probably that's the opportunity when everybody says that India can use what is happening as an opportunity perhaps that is more than some of the other arguments being offered. But before I get to how India should respond, one other argument that sometimes I read is people say that President Trump is only around for four years so probably let's just wait it out and soon enough the American consumers will protest enough and shifts will take place and President Trump may pipe down.
Would you also say that the do-nothing scenario is an option or would you say that India should use this opportunity to reshape global trade order because even we are not satisfied with how things have been so far.
Abhijit Das: Puja the do-nothing option is really no option even if President Trump is here for only four years and we don't have any certainty as we've read in the media he is exploring ways about having a third term or it's also possible that whoever comes after him might persist with his policies. So the reality is that if the present mayhem continues for four years it will really erode the cornerstones of the multilateral trading system. We've already seen through his actions President Trump has wiped out the non-discriminatory provision called most favoured nation provision at least from the US perspective.
Other countries continue to follow that but the US now is very clear it is no longer interested in following the requirement of an MFN obligation.
Puja Mehra: You may want to explain that for listeners.
Abhijit Das: Yes, I'm sorry I should have done that earlier. What the most favoured nation obligation is that it requires countries while they are engaging in exports and imports to give to each of the WTO members the same treatment which it extends on the best terms to any country in the other world. If I impose a 5% import tariff on let us say apple juice on imports from let's say Australia then I will extend that and if that is the lowest tariff I'm extending to any country then that 5% tariff has to be extended to the rest of the WTO membership.
Of course there are some exceptions to the MFN provision. Free trade agreement is an important exception but overall the MFN provision, the non-discriminatory treatment provision is really the cornerstone, one of the cornerstones of the WTO legal architecture. And now President Trump has really blown it into pieces by his reciprocal tariff order whereby not only is he breaching the commitments on bound tariffs which the US had given to the WTO but he is on the same imported product, he is going to be applying different levels of import duties.
So that really is a problem. Again to revert back to the original question, we can't wait for four years to let the crisis blow over. That would be too long, the damage to the trading system would be immense and after four years it may be almost impossible to get the system back on its foot.
So we have to take this opportunity to see how countries can revive the relevance of the WTO and if possible how to make it more development friendly.
Puja Mehra: Right and to think that India can get into bilateral trade agreements with the US or an FTA with other countries, that seems to be the thrust. But do you think, in light of what you're saying, do you think that is the most strategic move? I ask you this although you've already answered it.
I ask you this because I find unlike all other governments, the government of India has been very evasive. We are not being told how what has happened on April 2 hurts India. We are given some very broad statements like India stands to benefit because the tariff rates applied to other countries such as Vietnam are far much in excess of what is being applied to India.
So India can displace those countries as sources of imports for the US. But we don't even know what is being negotiated with the US. We know that an FTA seems very unlikely, like you'd explained also last time you were on the show, because the US has a laundry list of demands which probably do not suit India and therefore probably why there is this whole talk of a bilateral trade agreement being discussed.
The impression I have, please tell me if I'm right or I'm wrong, if we do a bilateral trade agreement then that will have to comply with or it ideally should comply with the MFN rule and therefore anything extended to the US may have to be extended to other WTO members. But what is being negotiated is not being said and let me also add, I'm asking so many questions at the same time, sorry for that, let me also add if the objective of the US negotiators is America first and if the mandate to them is to reduce their trade deficit with India or if not turn it into a surplus at least reduce the trade deficit and if India could find other buyers for our exports we would have done that by now.
So if we are saying that we want to do Atman-Ebhar-Bharat, how can the two be compatible? How can the US reduce their trade deficit with India and India which cannot find other destinations for our exports at the same time say that we are going to follow Atman-Ebhar-Bharat, the two simply cannot coexist.
Abhijit Das: You have raised a very difficult question Puja, let me see how best I can answer. In our attempt at bridging the trade deficit, one or two points are very clear. We will have to buy much more from the United States and as has been appearing in media reports, it appears that the government might be willing to buy more defence equipment from the US, there could be more purchases of energy products from the US but of course both these have to be at the correct prices and with terms and conditions which do not disadvantage us particularly in respect of defence procurement. So those two can be real big ticket items. It would be really very difficult for the normal merchandise trade to rise to the level that a.
it bridges the trade gap and b. It doesn't hurt the Indian domestic producers. That really is a very very difficult proposition.
What I'm saying is that if we keep defence purchases aside, if we keep energy trade aside, I would find it very difficult to imagine a situation where India increases its purchases of other products both industrial as well as agricultural from the US so that the trade deficit gets bridged but at the same time this increase in imports from the US does not harm our domestic producers. That is a very difficult situation to envisage. So this bridging of the trade deficit will have to be done mainly through defence procurement and energy products.
Now coming to the issue of secrecy in negotiations, unfortunately that is the nature of game when it comes to bilateral negotiations. In contrast at the WTO when negotiations commence we have in public domain what are the main objectives of the negotiations, what are the areas being negotiated. But when it comes to bilateral negotiations for FTAs or what is happening with the US, it's very rare that we will have anything in the public domain and that can result in anxiety in large segments of the industry, in the minds of people.
It can create misapprehensions as well. It would have been good if the government had made some statements saying that yes we are engaged in the bilateral BTA negotiations with the US but we will certainly be protecting the interest of our farmers. We will definitely not take commitments which would harm the interests of the generic pharmaceutical industry.
If the government were to make such statements or similar other statements I think that would really assuage or that would reduce the anxiety and remove misapprehensions that might be prevalent within the industry as well as with the common person in the street. I do hope that at some stage the government will come up with a clearer articulation of the scope of the BTA negotiations. Of course the nuts and bolts of the negotiations don't have to be revealed.
That is how the negotiations proceed. But some sort of calming statement from the government will really go a long way in dispelling incorrect notions, misapprehensions, worries, anxieties. Coming to the third issue which you raised about the concessions which India would make under the BTA.
If these are not part of a free trade agreement then under the existing rules of the WTO, you are very correct, these concessions would have to be extended on a non-discriminatory basis to other members of the WTO and which would be a very difficult task for India to do.
Puja Mehra: Do you think it's realistic for the government to say like they've been saying that they will be able to conclude this agreement with the US by November this year?
Abhijit Das: Again it would depend on what is the scope of the negotiations. If the negotiations are confined mainly to merchandise trade and further confined essentially to issues related to tariffs then it may not be very difficult to do so. However, if other issues come onto the negotiating table such as intellectual property rights or government procurement or digital trade then that will involve a lot of banging of heads and that can be time consuming.
So it really depends on what issues are in the negotiating mix and that is what will determine how long these negotiations are likely to take.
Puja Mehra: Let me ask you now about the announcement on April 2, the tariffs that have been announced on India and the relative tariffs or the differential between the tariff rates for India and other countries. What do you think is going to be the fallout on India and do you also believe that as some people do that India stands to gain because it could replace some of the other exporters to the US and some of the other markets?
Abhijit Das: Puja, the immediate fallout will be that our exporters will be at a disadvantage compared to producers in the United States. That's number one. If for the same product which India is exporting, alternate sourcing can be found by the importer within the United States then that definitely will push the US importer to source his requirements domestically.
So the 26 percent extra illegal tariff which India will have to pay will have an effect, a strong effect on our export performance. One cannot deny that. I have also read some reports, I have gone through some analysis which seems to suggest that since India will be confronted with 26 percent tariffs whereas some of our competitors such as China, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, they may have to face much higher tariffs.
So India could be at a relative advantage compared to the competitors. On paper it might appear to be so but the reality could be a bit different and let me give some reasons why the reality could be a bit different. Let's take a scenario where the US consumer for a particular product is willing to pay $100.
Will the same consumer now be willing to pay $126? It will of course depend on a number of factors. How essential is that particular product for the consumer?
If the US consumer cannot do without that product, then yes, the consumer may have to absorb that cost increase. On the other hand, if the product is not essential for the consumer, the demand within the US may come down. So even though we will be confronted with relatively lower tariffs compared to our competitors, a 26 percent hike itself could result in the product being so high priced that the US consumer may just reduce her demand.
Second, let's not rule out the possibility that some of our competitors may end up, rather the governments of these countries may end up providing huge subsidies to their exporters and these subsidies could facilitate the exporters to lower their prices, to in a way soften the blow of the higher tariffs which they are likely to face in the United States. Third, in particular in relation to the textiles and clothing sector, let's assume that the US demand doesn't come down, the governments in some of the competing countries do not indulge in heavy subsidisation, then the question which arises is, are our apparel producers, apparel exporters in a position to scale up and meet the consumer demand in the US? To my mind, at this juncture, they are not in a position to scale up their operations within a very short time span.
And finally, there is a bit of a technical issue, but that technical issue cannot be ignored. If we read the executive order carefully, these reciprocal tariffs will apply on what is technically called the non-US content of the product which any country would export, provided that the US content in that product is at least 20%. Let me simplify this.
Let's assume that Vietnam is exporting a shirt to the United States for $100. Let's just assume apparel. Now, if in that apparel, there are inputs which are at least $20, then that meets the 20% US origin requirement.
The 46% tax will apply to the remaining $80 of the export price. In other words, there could be changes in sourcing patterns of our competing exporters, whereby they could source their fabric from the US to take advantage of this provision in the executive order, whereby the higher tariffs will apply only to the non-US origin content, which is contained in the product imported into the US. So for these four or five reasons, I do think that the opportunity which our exporters, which our industry might smell at this needs to be weighed in light of some of these shortcomings or some of these other competing factors.
Puja Mehra: Yes, but then the follow-up question becomes, what happens to the whole China plus one, the global supply chain model of production and trade? Does that fall apart?
Abhijit Das: If we look at the executive order, the countries where some of the investments went out of China, for example, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, and a few countries in Africa, are precisely the countries which have been slapped with very high tariffs. 46% for Vietnam, slightly lower, but again, 48 or 47% for Laos, 49% for Cambodia. This is just an illustration.
So this China plus one strategy, whereby some of the investments came out of China, went to neighbouring countries, I think the presidential executive order tries to put some fetters around that strategy. Whether the China plus one strategy will see the investments flow out to countries like India or other countries will entirely depend on the possibility of profits which the investors see in markets like India or other countries. So again, we will see, we are likely to see a different pattern of China plus one strategy unfolding over the next few years.
Puja Mehra: In my mind, large-scale shifting out may still be difficult. I was reading, for instance, a company like Nike has more than four and a half lakh employees in Vietnam. They have more than 130 factories in a small country like Vietnam.
Won't they find it very difficult to relocate from there?
Abhijit Das: You are right. It's not going to happen overnight. But even earlier, let's remember, international capital has always been footloose.
It will go to that country, it will go to that place which offers it the highest possibility of profits. And if at this juncture it is not Vietnam which will give it higher profits, then the capital will certainly scout around, search out other countries which will provide it the possibility of higher profits. So it will take time, it will not happen overnight.
But that shift in capital is quite likely to happen.
Puja Mehra: And that, in some sense, is the objective of the executive order. President Trump is inviting these companies to return to the US, except that the labour costs over there are so high. So for labour-intensive goods, how do you think this will play out?
I'm specifically asking for labour-intensive goods also because that is where India is supposed to have the comparative advantage.
Abhijit Das: When it comes to labour-intensive goods, given the fact that the labour costs in the US are much higher than most of the other developing countries, I do not see investment flowing out of China, flowing out of Vietnam, out of Cambodia into the US. That is a bit of an unlikely scenario, unless President Trump fires the next salvo for which the template already exists in the free trade agreement between the US, Mexico and Canada, whereby in the auto sector there are some requirements on per-hour wages. Now, if similar requirements are enforced by President Trump in the textiles and clothing sector, that the US will not import from countries where wages are below the levels of the US, or if the levels of wages in those countries are below the US, then he will slap a much higher tariff.
If that conditionality were to be enforced by the United States, in that eventuality there could be a scenario where some of the investments in labour-intensive sectors could go to the United States.
Puja Mehra: And for my last question, I wanted to ask you to please crystal gaze a bit and tell us how you think this will play out? How will China respond? How will the EU respond?
How will companies, big companies, big American companies which have global supply chains respond? To what extent will President Trump succeed in what he is doing? And to what extent other countries will respond?
What shape will all of this take?
Abhijit Das: Puja, I'm looking at the crystal ball and it's completely hazy. In other words, there are a number of scenarios that could be possible. Countries like China, even Japan, possibly the European Union, will hold out threats.
Some of them will actually walk the talk and impose retaliatory tariffs. But at the same time, they might keep channels of communication, possibility of negotiations open with the United States. It's a harsh reality that none of us, none of the countries, be it small country, big or large country like China, would want to miss out on the opportunities to sell in the U.S. market. Now that will also determine how countries are able to combat what President Trump has been doing. If countries go with folded hands, bent at their knees, and try to align their tariffs and regulatory regime with what President Trump wants, then there's going to be no end to appeasement of the United States. And that is going to result in a complete collapse of any rules-based system that is likely to result in huge uncertainty, unpredictability, and deepening of worry lines on the foreheads of business leaders world over, including those in the United States.
Another possibility exists whereby consumers in the United States who are already facing an egg crisis, are hobbled with acute shortages of different daily-to-use products. That could result in a huge spike in unpopularity of President Trump, which could compel him to rethink his policies, as could a real sustained tanking of the stock market. That could again compel a rethink on the part of the U.S. administration. Another scenario could be that some countries look at the larger picture, the long-term picture, and they may be willing to take a temporary hit in their exports to the U.S., but instead, they may decide to join hands and take on President Trump. If that were to happen, that could provide the nucleus for other countries to derive strength, to come together, and see if through their actions, they could compel President Trump to come back to respecting international trade rules. One option which I have mentioned earlier in this regard is the possibility of countries saying very clearly that, well, if we impose retaliatory tariffs on U.S. exports of U.S., in respect of some products, we might be shooting ourselves in the foot. But if we suspend protecting the intellectual property of U.S. right-holders, then that might do a huge amount of service to the citizens of their countries. So, that is a scenario which I would not completely rule out, which could compel President Trump to get back on the path of respecting trade rules. But unfortunately, the possibility of this scenario unfolding appears a bit low at this juncture.
So, those are the three-four scenarios which might be evident through the crystal ball at this juncture, Puja.
Puja Mehra: Thank you. Thank you, Professor Das. Thank you so much.
insights into the current state of Trump's trade warThank you, Puja, for having me on your programme.
