India's Booming IPO Market Demand and Its Future with Ajay Bagga and Vivek Kaul

NOTE: This is a transcript of the interview including questions by the host and responses by the interviewee. Human eyes have gone through the script but there might still be errors in some of the text, so please refer to the audio in case you need to clarify any part. If you want to get in touch regards any feedback, you can drop us a message on [email protected].

So we've had a bumper and blockbuster initial public offer season going so far. Most of the deals have been small, smaller than $50 million perhaps, but we've had almost 90 deals this quarter, and it's already been called, that is India has been called the busiest IPO market worldwide, not in value terms, but definitely in volume terms.

So that makes it interesting. But it also interesting, rather what's interesting is the fact that the nature of some of those IPOs that we've been seeing, there has been much discussion about the two-wheeler showroom from New Delhi, which has raised money, but it was not just about raising money, it wanted to raise 12 crore rupees, but actually got subscription almost touching 5000 crore rupees. So that tells you something about the sheer demand for such initial public offers, obviously in the hope that they will list at a premium and people will make money.

Separately, there have studies, or one study at least, which has showed that most people who participate in particularly some of these smaller, small and medium enterprise IPOs actually get out of it within a week. So that's the nature of a lot of the investment that's happening, which is also in keeping with the larger trend of post-COVID investment trend. So this is the background.

So the question today is really to understand two or three things. One is, once again, why is this happening and what does history teach us, if it does anything? And secondly, as we go along, including in the context of the fact that the secondary markets themselves are hitting record highs, where could this go? And finally, what are the lessons for those who want to take away some lessons from this episode, if nothing else, to protect their own savings and investments?

GE: So happy to welcome both Ajay Bagga and Vivek Kaul. Ajay Bagga is a veteran market person and Vivek is a columnist with the livemint right now. So thank you both.So Ajay, let me start with you. And I leave it to you to approach this from whichever angle you wish to. So my question, of course, is why is this happening? And it's over to you.

AB: You know, the primary market, like the secondary market, is cyclical. And the cycle starts with very good offers, which leave a good amount for the investors on the table. Slowly, the promoters and the merchant bankers get more greedy. And then you see froth coming in. And then it ends in a crescendo with really paper-thin kind of financials being sold and the market crashing with that. So we are probably in the mid-cycle right now. We are enjoying the flows. And the background to this is the post-COVID or during the COVID gamification of investment, the ease of access, the crores of trading accounts and demat accounts which have been opened. And it's become very easy for investors. And we must understand the investor psychology because of the regulatory actions and the process…now, what is your maximum exposure? The money stays in your bank, whatever you put on the table. You will get at least your 2.5%-3% savings account interest. And on the other side, you apply in 8 to 10 applications each. And probably the broker pays you money per application. Or if you get a lottery and you allocation, you tend to make maybe 100%.So in a min-max sense, COVID, you at least make your savings account money or you get 100% listing gain. And everybody is on to this game right now.

GE: So that's an interesting point as well, that the system of participation in the IPO in itself encourages people to do so. Okay, we'll come back to that as well. Vivek, your thoughts going in?

VK: I think I agree with everything that Ajay said. And one more point that I would like to add is that, so if you look at a company like Bajaj Housing Finance, the company wanted to raise around six and a half thousand crores, right? And they ended up getting close to three lakh crore worth of money. So what does that tell you? It either tells you that a lot of private money is not finding enough investment avenues, or given the listing day pop, which in case of Bajaj Housing Finance was more than 130%, people are not, you know, happy investing in something that sort of pays them 10% per year. So I think it works both ways. And this is a major reason as to why things have come to the current stage.

And not just Bajaj Housing Finance, I mean, you gave the example of the two wheeler company, right? Or you look at PN Gadgil Jewelers, right? So we, you know, they ended up being oversubscribed, I think, around 70 times or some such number. So what does that tell you? And if you look at Bajaj Housing Finance, if you look at PN Gadgil, these are not VC funded businesses who are looking to, rather who are still looking to find their business model, right? These are robust, well established business models, where you know that these companies are going to make a certain amount of money. You know, a housing finance company cannot suddenly start making significantly more money than it was in the past, right? Or if the loan book of a housing finance company is growing at a very rapid rate, like let's say it's been growing at 20% per year, and then suddenly it starts growing at 50% per year, then you know that there is a problem growing up, because that can only happen if the quality of the loans being given out is being compromised on. So, you know, all these factors, I guess, come together.

GE: So Ajay, there is the fundamental part, and there is, let's say, the technical part. The technical part is obviously the perception that I will invest in something and that is bound to pop at a higher price, and therefore I should invest. And there's the fundamental. So what's your sense? I mean, are people at all paying attention to fundamentals, like the points that Vivek made about Bajaj Housing Finance?

AB: I think Vivek is spot on. And you know, what really intrigues me is that the gray market premium is talked about and is published in the media. You know, 20-30 years back, it was a hush-hush thing. And the broker would tell you that I'm giving you this much cash per application and I will get it sold at this much. Now you get a gray market premium. So investors know exactly what they are getting into. Nobody is doing any analysis, Govind.The flows are sitting in the banking system. Now you don't have to cut cheques to the broker anymore. With ASBA, you just mark a lien on it, you keep earning the interest, and the money doesn't go to the company and back. I remember, I say 20-25 years back, the company would negotiate with you that I'm going to get these many thousand crores of rupees. What interest rate will the merchant banker give you? So we as bankers would go with the merchant banker, pitch to the company, you would have to pay back the interest to the company. The borrower would be taking the money from an NBFC. RBI very smartly moved in and when it realised the amount of froth, one or two regulatory actions it took on NBFCs. Secondly, it limited the lending per account to one crore. So RBI has taken out very wisely the banks from this mess. But people are now punting with their money.There is no fundamental analysis as such. And the regulator also can't come in. We can't go back to the controller of capital issues marking the pricing. It's a free market and the caveat tempter is working. When people call me and ask about an IPO, I'll say, have you read anything? Have you seen 400,000 page documents, no one can read? It's just not possible. You ask two, three questions like the housing company, what Vivek was mentioning, 11 times the book you're talking. And then there were messages going around clubbing 8- 10 housing finance companies versus the market cap here. But has anyone seen the AUM? Has anyone seen the price to book? And what you mentioned very correctly, how fast are you growing? What is your credit cost? How old is your book? In which segments is your book line? Is it to retail, first-time house owners or is it developer loans? It's very easy. I can overnight build a book on developer loans. Very easy to get money in India. Very difficult to get it back even from the best marquee names. So the issue is a lot of liquidity, ease of access, newbie investors coming in. And you have these practices like the grey market premium is being shown all around. It's printed. So there is no sanctity to price discovery. You say, oh, this is the grey market and I am going to get this. So people are just punting them.

GE: So if I can take a step back for a moment, Vivek, so what is prompting people to punt so heavily in the IPO space? Now, of course, this has to be seen in the context of the overall flows of funds into the capital market. So we've got tens of thousands of crores going into mutual funds. We've got, obviously, investments going directly into secondary markets. And then there are people investing in maybe other classes like crypto and so on. So there seems to be much more fundamental, as in this is a much larger flow of funds seeking better returns than ever before, even proportionately, isn't it?

VK: Yes. So if you look at the history of finance, I mean, this is not the first time something like this is happening. So one of the first bubbles that happened was in the year 1720, which was the South Sea bubble in the UK. And even Isaac Newton got involved in that and lost money. And if you sort of, you know, read up books on the South Sea bubble, you'll find that, you know, one of the companies essentially put out a document in which it said that they wanted to raise money for an enterprise, which they will explain in due course. So this has happened. So 1929, before the Great Depression happened, companies raised money, the dotcom bubble, this happened. It happened before 2007-2008. I mean, I remember the night before the Reliance Power IPO was on, I was working late and I was going home in a cab provided by the, you know, by the newspaper I used to then work for. And even the driver sort of asked me, sir, the demat account is open. I have opened it and tomorrow I am going to invest in Reliance Power. So this happens. So it's, you know, you can call it human greed, which essentially takes over, you know, over and over again. But, you know, this time around, I guess, as Ajay rightly pointed out, it is very easy to invest in an IPO in comparison to what used to be the case in the past.

So, you know, the process is just a click of a button and a click of a button that can, you don't even need to take out your laptop or start your desktop if you still have one. You just need to take out your phone and, you know, press a few buttons and you're good to go. I mean, I don't think there is, I mean, any other reason. I mean, this is as simple as it gets.

Also, I think one more point is the fact that while this is not directly linked to, you know, the current state of IPOs, one needs to point out that, you know, interest rates in the post-pandemic world came down to such a low level that it sort of forced people to look for other avenues of return. And I think that impact of that we are still seeing, even though the interest rates have since gone up. But, you know, interest rates were probably 4% - 4.5% - 5% on FDs and now they are 7- 7.5% - 8%. So, there is a difference of 2 to 3%. But, you know, when you're making a listing day gain of 50% and 60%, or I think the average gain this year is around 48%, I mean, a higher interest rate of 2 to 3% is not going to make an impact. So, I think all these factors come together.

GE: So, Ajay, one of the reasons why IPOs do well on listing is obviously because they are priced, at least in relative terms, lower to potential at that point of time. So, do you feel that is something which may be distorting the market somewhat, that maybe the IPOs are actually being priced low or, of course, the converse could also be equally true, which is that, you know, the demand is so high that you price it at anything and then it's still going to pop at a much higher price?

AB: Yeah, I don't think India is a cheap market by any standards. So it's not that the merchant bankers are leaving much on the table. That's when you're coming off a bear market and just as you're getting the green shoots, then you get the best pricing. Now, we are in a raging bull market, which has gone on for years on end, and we are not cheap by any standards. It is more a question of the momentum and the flows.

Why is India underweight? Even though MSCI emerging markets, we have a 20 percent plus share, we are not getting those FI flows. Last two and a half years, if you see, FI's actually pulled out five and a half lakh crores from India. The domestics put in eleven and a half lakh crores.

So it is a question of the domestic flows. In say about 20 years back, you would get three percent of household savings coming in mutual funds. Now you're getting nine percent plus if you see the marginal savings of the affluent class, that nearly 25 to 35 percent is coming into the equity markets, whether through mutual funds, insurance or directly investing and including IPO.

So the scale has become a lot.

Why? I am not afraid of something like the SME… SME last year, they raised about four and a half thousand crores. This year, they have total raised five thousand. That two pony outfit, which got a four thousand crore subscription, was going to raise twelve crores. In the end, they got twelve crores only. That is the value at risk. So it's not systemic. The SME is a lot of froth.

There are a lot of operators. It has become a jungle out there. All that is fine. And the good companies will get, you know, clubbed along with all the operated stocks. And unfortunately, it's just five thousand crores. Rest of the market…Then you're talking a five trillion dollar market at 21-22 times one year forward, which all FIs, if you ask them… are China sitting on four years of underperformances at nine times. So they are still seeing that. Is there any way to invest in China? And all that. It's taken four years of negative returns to break the back of the Chinese investments. But India still, we are under-owned. Most of the portfolios are underweight as far as the foreign investors go. So it's not merchant bankers. The biggest joke was one of the newbie companies, the CFO came and he said, I'm leaving money on the table for investors. That was the biggest joke that should be played every year in the ignoble kind of awards.

GE: So let me ask, you know, the kind of question I think that follows from this is that what are the signals that we are reading from the way the primary market is moving right now that should either act as a warning or as some kind of alert to the rest of the market? So Vivek, you first.

VK: So, you know, basically, it's a question of the fact that people need to realize that while average returns of investing in Indian stocks over the years have been 11, 12, 13 percent.

I mean, it depends on what kind of math you're comfortable looking at. But those average returns are average returns, right? So to give you a sense of, you know, some sense of numbers from January 1995 to around I think October 2003, the NSE 500 index, which is a pretty good representation of the broader market, did not give any returns. But from October 2003 to January 2008, it gave returns of 47 percent per year. From January 2008 to January 2018, the returns were around 5.8 percent per year. So the FD, et cetera, could have, you know, beaten the market returns. And then again, from March 2020 to you know, we are in almost in September 2024, the returns have been around 35 percent per year.So the returns that the stock market gives are bunched up, whereas, you know, so we have already seen this cycle run for a while.

So expecting now, while I am, you know, I have no way of predicting that the market will fall or by how much will it fall or whether the market will continue to go up or by how much it will go up, I don't know all that…. but what I can tell you for a fact is that the kind of returns that we have seen in the past four, five years, four years, 4.5 years actually, is not the way to go forward and is something that will not happen. And that is something that investors need to realize and start factoring it in their expectations, which is not happening currently, because, you know, if you see the kind of money that is chasing IPOs, that's humongous.

GE: Ajay, how are you reading this? I mean, should we, I mean, what signals are the IPO markets transmitting at this point which should perhaps worry us about the larger markets?

AB: No, see, I am for a free market. So I am saying, one, people, when they make money, they take all the credit as the, you know, yellow things start hitting the roof, they will blame the regulator. The regulator is not to blame. They have made it an efficient market. The pricing is not efficient. That's in the hand of a cabal which controls it and they are feeding on people's greed. The biggest question, I think, is the day after, the month after, and the year after. So it's clear that your min-max is very clear between 2.5- 3 percent versus listing gain is your maximum range of options till the day of listing.

The day after, the month after, the year after, there is no answer because when you have such frothy valuations, what will happen to these overbid, oversubscribed stocks one year down the line? That is the big question. Eleven times the price to book doesn't happen anywhere in the world or you have to be growing at 100 percent for the next five, six years and then you can work backwards and justify. When the public sector with a similar AUM is running at one and a half times price to book, the market has gauged them and done it properly. But when an IPO comes in like this, you are going to see accidents. And then one big accident like the name Vivek was mentioning in 2008, one big accident will come and that will bring down the markets. Hopefully we are a little far away from that. But the flows are huge. The regulator can only do that much to protect investors. They will find ways through it. And each household has seven, eight demat accounts and they are applying, trying to play the lottery. People say I put in 13 applications, 15. So all relatives, everybody, including the 150-year-old Ajji, are being made to sign and put a DMAT. So, you know, this is happening and it's not at a cheap price. It's not for very good products. And there is no day after, month after or year after. There is no guarantee. It's not like you're putting money in a mutual fund which is professionally run, blah, blah, blah. And you will get your 10 to 12 percent, hopefully 14 percent kind of returns. This is a pure punt. It's a pure gamble that's being played.

GE: I'm going to come to some, let's say, advice on what to do to the extent that anyone will listen, but in a few minutes. But before that, Ajay, you talked about, you know, the fact that the ease of, let's say, investing, the fact that there is so less or such less friction now in, you know, the ability to or the actual act of, you know, swiping and then transferring money from your bank. And that money too is an Escrow of sorts. So you don't actually lose anything. Do you feel that there could be something there which could maybe be changed or maybe made a little more difficult for investors so that they at least maybe think twice?

AB: Very, very difficult to say. You know, you could have one option where market makers take over and they take the IPO. So then a few investment banks will rule your market. They will pick up everything from the promoter and they will bundle it out to their UHNI, HNI kind of clients. And slowly the stock will list and then the retail investor can enter. So that is one model.

I'm not for that. This is not a great model either, but at least it's giving access to 35 percent of it to the retailer. They have a chance and people are using various probabilities and various ways of trying to max the business.

Very little the regulator can do in terms of allowing the companies. Exchanges have now started one or two cases where they have not allowed the company to use the proceeds. Very few.

You know, when the merchant banker is signing off, I think that is true… Like in banking, Govind, we were taught that credit starts from the customer entering. Once the customer has entered the system, you know, the bad guys will flow through 30 days, 60 days, 90 days, write off straight. So either you catch it there later on, collections is a very difficult process. So merchant bankers also are running to get their fees and fees are very handsome in these IPOs. And, you know, there are bragging rights. So I don't have an answer as such from the regulatory viewpoint of a model. Maybe Vivek Sir has seen some models abroad, but I would not like the market makers to take over. Then cabal will run your markets. That is also not an option like what happens in the West.

GE: So, Vivek, I mean, if I can supplement that question, you know, we do have a lot of very high profile IPOs which are underwater, including some of the tech IPOs. So but obviously people do not necessarily or have not taken away any real lessons from that. And that's, I guess, part of a free market. But what's your sense? I mean, is there is there some other way of educating, let's say, investors or at least pointing them in a certain direction and saying at least look at this before you jump?

VK: See, you know, recently Ashwini Bhatia, who's a full time member of SEBI, he asked or rather, you know, he was, I think, giving a speech somewhere. And in that speech, he asked the chartered accountants, the merchant bankers and the exchanges to do proper due diligence of these IPOs. You know, I think, I mean, that's something that needed to be said. But beyond that, you know, it doesn't really matter. And see, the thing is that no merchant banker ever went to jail for selling an IPO at a price which is not justified, because if a merchant banker had gone to jail, then the system of capitalism, the system of free markets, as it has evolved, would have never evolved. So what we think of as a bug in the system is actually a feature, if you allow me to say that. So I don't think there is anything that can be done. I mean, I think I agree with Ajay on this completely. And these are cycles which play out over and over again. And in every cycle, a new generation of investors learns some old investing truths. Or maybe it's the old generation which also learns some of the old truths all over again. So I don't think there is a way out of this because, you know, the system that existed before this was a finance ministry bureaucrat sitting somewhere in Delhi, basically the controller of capital issues and then deciding, you know, one guy deciding whether to or one guy or a committee or whatever it used to be, I don't know, deciding that whether this IPO, this company should be allowed to raise money or not. So that is a step backward.

The one thing that I think that can possibly be done is that the Securities and Exchange Board of India can use its investor education fund in a slightly better way and run some education campaigns on being careful about an IPO and so on and so forth. Also, I think what can be done is something along the lines of, again, funded by the SEBI investor fund, you could have a sort of an institution which has a, I mean, I don't know how much how feasible is this…but you could have an institution, like, you know, in the US, there are these consumer reports about products. So you would have a SEBI funded institution, which could sort of simplify a draft red herring prospectus of 400 pages into around four pages without essentially saying whether an investor should buy that stock or not. So something along those lines can be done.

GE: Yeah, that's an interesting one. Go ahead Ajay.

AB: Well, I would like to share two very quick stories, you know, Evergrande, you know, the most indebted developer in the world, $300 billion. China has fined a Big Four agency $64 million, still small change, because $80 billion of sales were overstated, Govind, $80 billion. But still, they have done a $64 million fine. And they have disallowed that Big Four company from practicing in China, whole of China for six months. We have written off 16 lakh crores of banking NPAs. Has one Big Four been hauled up? Has one Big Four partner been put behind the bars? Yes, a few small auditors in one or two cases have been given 10 crore, which they have never earned in their lives. You know, the mom and pop auditors who don't have any way of fighting back with the NFRA. They have been given, but the Big Four, Big Six, Big Eight, they get away with it. So one is catch them there. I would totally agree.

Second, make it illegal, like Dabba Trading, to be quoting a GMP. Now, GMP is all over the place.

So you are actually taking a gamble for three days and the regulator is making it more and more faster. So the same money, people are actually talking, oh, this, has it come tonight? Has the lien mark been removed? I want to apply tomorrow morning. That is the kind of stuff and the bankers are feeling the heat because money is going out of banks into all these things.

But remember, when the day after, the month after, and the year after happens, when all these go down to 20-30% of their listing prices, that's when you will get enough of this. That will be late cycle. Again, I'm saying we are probably mid-cycle because so much money is coming in and you don't have enough paper. So this is a mega trend. It's like the US of the 1980s, 81 Ronald Reagan started the 401k pension plans. The mutual fund industry was $60 billion in the US, 1981. Today, it is like trillions. Anybody and everybody's $1 trillion AUM is no big deal, $9 trillion, $10 trillion kinds…It just took off like anything. We are in that kind of a mode right now in India and this probably it's a roaring 20s, you know, post the Spanish flu, what you found. It ended in 1929, but you had 5-7 great years. We are probably there. That's why I keep saying mid cycle. I have no clue. I am not qualified to tell where we are in the cycle, but this is just my gut from three decades in the market. I still think it's mid cycle, but the excesses are showing up. The penalties are not showing up.

I'll give you one more story. I forgot and I made this long story, but foreign banker, a mentee of mine, works in a treasury, just caught me the other day. And he says, I'm up to this in equities. I said, okay, look at your asset allocation. I thought he wants some advice, what to do at all time highs. No, no, no. I have my provident fund against which I can borrow. Should I borrow that and put in? I said, do you understand? Do you understand valuation? Do you understand DCFs? You understand value at risk? I said, when this goes down, you will lose your retirement as well. I said, what asset allocation? No, no. And he just practically blocked my number that this uncle has no clue in life. This is what's happening with the well aware, a treasury person in a foreign bank, a mentee of mine talking like this.

GE: Greed takes over, I mean, for everyone. So last question or two, and I'm going to come back to you Ajay and first Vivek. So one of the things that we've seen, and I guess this also happens in every such IPO cycle is a lot of promoters, founders, initial investors selling, and we've seen large amounts of that happening as well. Is there anything in that that should perhaps alert investors about being more careful about one set of IPOs versus the other? And that's one question, which is a specific one. And the general one is your maybe one or two points of advice to those who want to listen to this conversation or to you. Go ahead Vivek. Okay.

VK: I just first I wanted to add to what Ajay just said. So the other day I saw this reel and I mean, it's important to talk about it because this era has finfluencers, financial influencers who were not there in an earlier era. So this gentleman essentially was comparing, you know, equity returns with that of the public provident fund. Now, PPF, as you would know, currently gives a return of around 7.1% per year. So his logic was that, but equity over the long term gives a return of 12%-13% per year. So, which is why you should not be doing PPF, but you should be doing only equity. Now, you know, when you reach such a stage where people compare different kinds of investment products without taking their inherent risk into account, because, you know, any return is always a function of the risk that you take on. Then you know that, you know, there is a problem ahead. So the analogy that I like to give in these situations is that, you know, you buy an umbrella, not when it starts to rain, right? You buy an umbrella before it starts to rain and you keep it with yourself and you take it around. But, you know, when you keep it with yourself and take it around, and if it doesn't rain, then you know that the cost of that umbrella is essentially the, you know, the situation where you pay for ensuring that when it rains, you have the umbrella ready, right? You don't go out buying an umbrella once it starts to rain. Which is why asset allocation, I think is the most diversification, not putting your eggs in one basket is the most important investment truth out there. And that's something that people have forgotten.

Now to answer your specific question, see, you know, you have so many promoters unloading their stake onto the, you know, onto the stock market, onto the retail investors. Now, I think one number that I saw published some time back was during the course of this financial year close to, you know, one lakh crore worth of shares have been sold by promoters of companies which are already listed. I'm not talking about IPOs. Now when promoters, you know, nobody knows their business better than the promoter does. And if these guys are selling out on their shares, you know, that in itself tells you something. I mean, they are taking money which is easily available off the table, right? So they are making money when the sun's shining. So this should be a good enough hint to a lot of retail investors out there who are punting big time and, you know, punting a greater and a very large proportion of their portfolio on to equity.

So, you know, I mean, again, to sort of, you know, give that big disclaimer, I'm not for a moment trying to suggest that people should not invest in stocks and invest only in FDs and gold, etc. But what I'm trying to say is that it has to be at any point of time, you have to distribute your money across asset classes and within asset classes. I think that is very, very important.

GE: And that's a very useful piece of advice. Ajay, last word to you.

AB: No, like, you know, the crypto exchange in India, which lost 50% of customers, there is nothing, no talk about it. And, you know, the amount, all the business channels that started crypto programs with the anchors not understanding what crypto is at all. And you can't blame the business channels. Today, all the big asset managers want to do the custody because after FTX, they are saying if we can get the custody right, at least nobody is saying what is the underlying. So greed, fear and greed are, you know, are human emotions. We can't change that.

What you can do is have tight regulations, and have some cost of admission. I think all that is being worked on. But this ends badly in every cycle. And then a new generation comes in.

You know, again, you will say, why is this guy talking everything 20-30? But L.C Gupta report in 92 had actually shown how US 64 Govind, it brought up, it had taken just pre-Harshad breaking, 11% of household financial savings were coming into equities. We have just about reached that. This is 92, nobody remembers. Second thing that they showed, a new breed of investor comes in every time, comes directly into the market, loses shirt pants and swears off and stays in fixed deposit all their life. It used to happen like that. Now it has happened cyclically throughout. Same guys come back. I remember once, you know, I was doing a seminar and one fund manager was with me. And one small promoter that I knew, stock had gone to 600, come down to 20. He came with a bouquet for the fund manager. Fund manager was very embarrassed. This was 2003 to 2008, when the model was—uncle in Jaipur, you want to come, my fund will put money with you and you give this much equity to the uncle and we will ratchet up. You also sell what… Vivek sir mentioned, this 1 lakh crore, which has gone out of promoters. Not all are like that, but you don't sell the family jewellery. So somebody is selling at a price thinking either they will buy it at a lower level or they are thinking, I will never get more valuation than this in the next 4-5 years. Very few might be doing to deleverage or something. Deleverage the government has done. You and I have paid as taxpayers those 16 lakh crores. It's gone and sealed and all the promoters are in the Bahamas happily and we are all the poorer for it. So these things will keep on happening and no regulator can, people will curse the regulator post-facto, but it is pure greed.

You see those scams, every 3-4 weeks, somebody will call me on a WhatsApp scam and in the newspaper, you get it nearly every week. But I am seeing with 6 degrees of separation, if somebody known comes to you, that some friend's brother calls or these option trading guys called me and I thought I was riding them, they were riding me and I lost 2 crores in the end. What can I do? And you just give them the cyber crime number and say not much more than this. All this is happening. Cyber is happening. Your crypto is happening. 50% of an exchange gets hacked. Nobody is talking about anything. The FTX guy was at least put behind bars.

Here we don't have it. We have no clue and government says we don't regulate it. We only tax it.

Finished story.

GE: Right. So a lot of lessons in that, I think, and insights, including how markets have behaved and how cycles have moved in the last few decades. I think those are important things to take away, even if you don't take any of the serious or the specific serious advice on where to put your money or not.